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The Spanish economy has experienced dramatic economic changes in the last
three decades, and its economic performance has slowly approached the European
average, although not consistently over time.  At the beginning of the 1960s GDP per
capita in Spain was less than 60 percent of the average of the countries that now
comprise the European Union, but by 1975 the Spanish figure was nearly 80 percent
of the average.  It fell again after the oil crisis and the important political and social
changes that occurred in Spain on its road to democracy, but by the early 1990s Spain
was 75 percent of the European average.
1
Within this broad context, regions in Spain exhibited large differences among
themselves in GDP per capita.  Even though Spain slowly approached the European
average, some regions have been near the European average since the 1960s (for
example, País Vasco, Madrid and Cataluña), while Baleares actually exceeded the
average in the 1990s.  Other regions were around one-third of the average in the
1960s (Extremadura, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha and Galicia are examples) and
had barely reached 50 percent of the European average by the 1990s.
Although the Spanish government made attempts at regional policy in the
1960s (the "Planes de Desarrollo" is the most characteristic example), it was not until
the decentralization process in the 1980s, which created the regional governments
called Comunidades Autónomas or Autonomous Communities, that a regional
                                                       
     
1See Marimón (1996) for a detailed description of the economic fortunes of Spain
during the past three decades.solidarity fund was established.  The Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial (FCI)
was established in 1982 as a redistributive fund aimed at reducing disparities among
regions through mainly public investment projects.
2  With the addition of Spain to the
European Community in 1986, the regions in Spain also benefitted from the European
regional policy, and especially the European Fund for Regional Development
(FEDER).
The purpose of both of these regional policies, the Spanish central government
FCI policy and the regional policy of the European Union, was to encourage the
development of poor regions in order to reduce large differences among the regions. 
How successful these policies have been in achieving their goal is still an open
question, and is the subject of this paper.  Essentially, we address two questions: i)
What have been the fortunes of poorer regions in Spain and their relative evolution
with respect to richer regions since the implementation of regional policies?, ii) What
have been the private market responses to these policy innovations, and in particular,
has private investment been stimulated by the regional policies?
Several studies have analyzed the evolution of the regional economies of
Spain, without relating them explicitly to regional policies.  These studies can be
framed within the convergence literature that follows the work of Barro and Sala-i-
Martín (1991) and that for Spain has materialized mainly in two papers, Dolado et al.
                                                       
     
2See Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1991) and (1993) for an analysis of the FCI
program and its effects on the public finances of the Autonomous Communities. 
They find that the FCI is largely a redistributive grant and that the regional
governments have very little autonomy over spending.(1994), which examines convergence at the provincial level for 1955-89, and Mas et
al. (1994a), which analyzes regional convergence for 1981-91.  They find that the
convergence process in Spain is strong until the mid 1970s, but then it slows or is
nonexistent during the 1980s, a pattern that is not unique to Spain (see Canova and
Marcet, 1995).
An important characteristic of the regional grants is their relationship to public
investment, and it is therefore important to consider the literature that has analyzed for
Spain the impact of public capital on the development of regional economies.  Mas et
al. (1994b) estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function with public capital as one
input for the 17 regions of Spain for 1980-89 and finds a range of 0.182 to 0.220 for
the elasticity of output with respect to public capital.  The authors do not test for
stationarity of the series; if non-stationarity is present as other similar studies have
found, it would shed doubt on the significance of these results (see Garcia-Milà,
McGuire and Porter, 1996).
The work of de la Fuente and Vives (1995) attempts to address directly the
issue of whether the European Union's FEDER grant was effective at stimulating
regional growth.  Because they lack regional private investment data, they assume
perfect mobility of private capital and perfect immobility of labor and public capital. 
Assuming that FEDER funds are spent on public capital, they evaluate its impact on
regional growth through the response of output to public capital in their estimated
regional production function, concluding that the FEDER funds had a small but
significant effect on output.  There are limitations to this analysis related to the lack ofdata and the assumptions made.  First, they are restricted to three years of public
capital data for estimation of the production function.  Second, the assumptions made
about the mobility of the factors can be questioned; important differences in average
productivity of private capital observed in Spain's regions suggest that there may not
be perfect mobility of private capital among the regions of Spain.
While it remains controversial as to whether public investment has been a
major factor in the development of regions, it is important to understand to what
extent any impact has been more than the direct effect generated by the public
investment in a region; in other words, is the public investment triggering any private
economic activity besides the activity directly related to the intervention?  Garcia-Milà
and Marimón (1996) attempt to answer this question by undertaking a sectoral
analysis of the regional economies of Spain.  They find that development of poor
regions with large public interventions during the 1980s, such as Andalucía,
Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha, occurred in the public or semi-public sectors,
but there was little improvement in the manufacturing or private services industries.
In this paper we continue the lines of inquiry that seek to evaluate the overall
impact of public interventions in regional economies and to determine to what extent
the private market responds to these types of public incentives.  A variable of primary
interest is private investment because, in the long run, only if private investors are
induced by the public intervention to invest in poor regions can the intervention be
deemed a success.
In section I we summarize the regional policies of both the Spanish and theEuropean governments.  Section II is a description of the economic performance of
the regions of Spain between 1964 and 1994.  In section III we analyze how the
regional policies have affected the economies of the regions by comparing their
economic performance before and after the regional public interventions.  In the final
section we present our conclusions.
I. Regional Grants from the European Union and the Central Government of
Spain
Regions in Spain receive regional grants from two sources, the Spanish
central government and the European Union.  The Spanish redistributive or solidarity
fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial, FCI) was created in 1982, within the
framework of fiscal decentralization that began in Spain in 1979.  Initially, the FCI
was designated as a certain percentage of the central government's public
infrastructure investment, with the idea of reinforcing public investment in all regions,
but favoring those regions with relatively low income per capita, net out-migration of
population, and relatively high levels of unemployment.  With time the FCI became
less redistributive and it evolved into a method of financing responsibilities given to
the regional governments by the central government.  In 1990 the FCI was revised
once again to be a purely redistributive grant, and after a period of transition, only
relatively poor regions received monies under the FCI.  Also, more flexibility was
allowed for how the FCI monies could be spent in order better to coordinate with the
funds received from the European Union.
Grants from the European Union (EU), which Spain began to receive in 1986upon its entry into the EU, can be grouped into three types of policies: i) Agricultural
Policy, with two main programs, FEOGA-Garantía and FEOGA-Orientación, ii)
Social Policy, mainly the Social European Fund (FSE), and iii) Regional Policy,
mainly the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER).  Of the three the
Agricultural Policy has absorbed the largest share of the EU budget, amounting to 75
percent of the total budget in 1975, falling to 50 percent of the budget by 1993.  The
FEOGA-Garantía, a program to guarantee a minimum income to farmers, accounts for
about 90 percent of the total going to agricultural policies, leaving a much smaller
amount for the FEOGA-Orientación program, which is a program intended to
improve farming structures and infrastructure.
The purpose of the primary Social Policy program, the FSE, is to educate and
train workers, particularly young and long-term unemployed members of the labor
force.  The training is expected to improve the chances of obtaining employment and
of switching employment from declining industries to growing industries.
The Regional Policy, with its primary program FEDER, is directed towards
reducing regional differences through the support of public and private investment. 
Its importance has increased over time, going through several reforms since its
inception in 1975.
The structural funds from the above three policies, FEOGA-Orientación, FSE
and FEDER, are distributed to regions according to six objectives as specified in the
policy directives of the European Union.  Three of these objectives are specifically
aimed at regions: i) Objective 1, to promote the development and structuraladjustment of less developed regions; ii) Objective 2, to help regions affected by
industrial decline; and iii) Objective 5b, to help the development of agricultural areas.
 Three additional objectives do not have a regional focus: i) Objective 3, to fight long-
term unemployment; ii) Objective 4, to help youth find jobs; and iii) Objective 5a, to
help renew agricultural structures.
In 1993 a new program was created.  The purpose of the Cohesion Fund is to
finance environmental programs and trans-european network investment in countries
with income per capita below 90 percent of the EU average.  This fund is still small
compared to the other funds and is not analyzed here.  In our analysis we focus on the
Spanish FCI program and on the three EU programs whose purpose is to stimulate
economic activity through structural reform of the labor market and through regional
economic development projects. 
Tables 1 and 2 display cumulative amounts received by each community from
each of the fund programs from the first year of the program to the most recent year
for which data are available.  Table 1 displays these figures on a per capita basis,
while Table 2 displays the figures as a percentage of GDP.  All figures are in real
1980 pesetas.  The final columns of the tables display the totals for two aggregates,
one being an aggregate over the EU structural funds only, and the other includes the
EU structural funds as well as the FCI.
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3Note that because of the way the aggregate figures have been calculated, we
cannot provide a total for all structural funds as a percentage of GDP because of the
different time periods of the EU funds and the FCI.On average, the largest of the structural funds (structural funds consist of all
funds except the income support program FEOGA-Garantía) was the FCI.  However,
the FCI had been in operation since 1982, four years before Spain's entry to the
European Union.  The FEDER program was also relatively important, while the FSE
fund and particularly the FEOGA-Orientación were relatively small.  It is important to
note that the aggregate intervention represented by the various funds is generally quite
small.  The total of all structural funds over the period 1982-1993 for Spain was
50,841 pesetas per person, compared with GDP per capita in a single year, 1991, of
501,806 pesetas (in 1980 pesetas).  Total EU structural funds as a share of GDP over
the period 1986-1991 for Spain was 0.46 percent, while FCI funds over the 1982-91
period were 0.63 percent of GDP.  This is in comparison with total private (public)
investment as a share of GDP at 17.9 (4.5) percent in 1991.
That being said, the funds were somewhat important for many of the poorer
regions.  Using total structural funds per capita (the final column of table 1) the top
six recipients were Andalucía, Canarias, Castilla-León, Castilla-La Mancha,
Extremadura and Galicia, all of which received more than 70,000 pesetas per capita. 
By comparison, the average real disposable income per capita for these regions in
1990 was approximately 330,000 pesetas (in 1980 pesetas).
As can be seen by examining the coefficients of variation displayed in the last
rows of tables 1 and 2, there was significant variability across the seventeen regions in
the amounts received under the four structural funds.  The most variable of the
structural funds was the FEDER followed by the FCI.  Because these two funds arethe largest, the fact that they vary significantly across regions implies that there is a
potential for differential impacts.
Three regions, Extremadura, Castilla-León, and Castilla-La Mancha, were top
recipients for each of the four structural funds.  Extremadura, in particular, received
significantly more than the Spanish average from all four structural funds.  Other
regions that were consistently above average recipients of funds included Andalucía
and Canarias (for FEDER, FCI and FSE) and Asturias (for FEDER, FSE, and
FEOGA-Orientación).  In addition, Galicia received a relatively large aggregate
amount under the FCI program.
Regions that were consistently below average in terms of receipts under each
of the four structural funds were Baleares, Cataluña, and Madrid.  Four additional
regions, C. Valenciana, Navarra, País Vasco, and La Rioja, received relatively small
amounts under the two biggest structural funds, FEDER and FCI.  Using the last
column of figures from table 1, five regions, Baleares, Cataluña, Madrid, Navarra, and
La Rioja, received less than 30,000 pesetas per capita during the period.
To summarize, in general the recipient regions consisted of Andalucía,
Asturias, Canarias, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla-León, Extremadura and Galicia.  The
non-recipient regions consisted of Baleares, Cataluña, C. Valenciana, La Rioja,
Madrid, Navarra, and País Vasco.  As we will see below, the recipient regions tended
to be poorer and less developed than the non-recipient regions.  In fact, the correlation
between total funds per capita (the final column of table 1) and 1981 GDP per capita
is -0.9.Figure 1 illustrates the evolution over time of the average per capita amounts
for Spain for the four structural funds from 1982 to 1993.  The FCI declined in
importance over time especially during the 1982-87 period, and again in the early
1990s.  FEDER increased steadily until the early 1990s when it reached a plateau and
then declined.  FSE and FEOGA-Orientación displayed a slight upward trend over the
period.  Until 1991, the average FCI grant per capita was larger than the average
FEDER grant per capita.  A major change in the FCI program in 1991, notably the
fact that several richer regions no longer received monies under this program, caused
the average FCI to fall dramatically, so that for 1992 and 1993, the average FEDER
grant per capita was nearly double the average FCI grant per capita, which was very
similar in size to the FSE and FEOGA-Orientación grants.
II. Economic Performance of the Regions of Spain 1964-1994
The seventeen regions of Spain, the so called Comunidades Autónomas, are
quite different in their economic and social characteristics.  For example, income per
capita varies significantly among the regions.  Although differences across the regions
have diminished over time, especially during the 1960s and 1970s (see Dolado et al.,
1994 and Mas et al., 1994a for studies of convergence over time), the rank order of
the regions has remained almost unchanged over the period we consider.
To describe the economies of the regions and their evolutions, we present
several statistics for six years spanning a 30-year time period: the starting and ending
points of our sample (1964 and 1994, typically), and four intermediate years, the peak
before the first oil crisis affected the Spanish economy (1973), the year before theSpanish interregional transfer program began (1981), the trough before the latest
expansion (1985), and the end of the most recent expansion (1991).  All peseta-
denominated figures are in real 1980 pesetas.
GDP, Employment, and Industrial Mix
Table 3 presents GDP per capita for 1964, 1973, 1981, 1985, 1991 and 1994
expressed as indices relative to Spain (set at 100).  The ranking of the regions has not
changed much over time; regions at the top and bottom of the distribution have
remained in their positions with few changes.  A clear exception is País Vasco, the
richest region in 1964, with GDP per capita 62 percent above the Spanish average.  It
then suffered a big loss and by 1981 was only 10 percent above average, remaining in
that position for the remainder of the period, and far below the top regions.  Cantabria
suffered a similar reversal of fortune, being among the top five in 1964, but with
values below average from 1981 on.  On the other end, Baleares witnessed an
improvement in relative standing, ending the period at the top position, significantly
better off than Madrid, the next region in ranking.
Baleares, Madrid and Cataluña were the richest regions at the end of the
sample, and they were among the top four at all times.  Aragón, Navarra, La Rioja,
and País Vasco comprised the next richest group in 1994 and generally throughout the
30-year period.  Extremadura was consistently the poorest region, followed with some
distance by Andalucía, Castilla-León, Castilla-La Mancha, Galicia and Murcia, with
slight changes in ordering over time.  The poorest regions in 1981, just prior to the
implementation of the Spanish interregional grants program, were Extremadura,Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, and Galicia; with Castilla-León and Murcia following
at some distance.
Table 4 presents average annual growth rates of real GDP per capita.  The
average growth rate for Spain varied considerably from one period to the next.  The
1964-73 period was a period of fast growth, with an improvement in GDP per capita
of over five percent per year.  Beginning in mid-1970 the growth rate was slow for
more than a decade until the big expansion of the second part of the 1980s when the
growth rate was around four percent before declining sharply in the most recent
recession.  The fast growth of GDP per capita from 1964 to 1973 was reflected in a
large increase in labor productivity.  The period of moderate growth of GDP per
capita from 1973 to 1985 was a period of large employment losses that resulted in an
unemployment rate of almost 22 percent in 1985.
The average growth rate of GDP per capita for Spain was not equally
distributed among regions.  Some relatively poor regions grew quite fast, as was the
case of Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and Galicia.  The three regions in the North
Cantabric corner, País Vasco, Cantabria and Asturias, had below average growth rates
in almost all periods, which reflects their decline in the rankings for many measures. 
The rich regions had irregular behavior, with high growth in some periods and low in
others; the latest recession affected the rich regions in a very uneven way as witnessed
by Cataluña and Madrid having experienced negative growth rates while Baleares
experienced an increase in GDP far above the average.  These patterns are consistent
with a narrowing of the differences among the regions over time in GDP per capita. While in 1964 the richest region, País Vasco, had per capita GDP three times that of
Extremadura, by 1994 the richest region, Baleares, was a bit more than twice as rich
as Extremadura.
The Spanish evolution of employment parallels the evolution of GDP for the
most part but not for all regions nor all periods.  The period of 1964-1973, a period of
high growth of GDP per capita, exhibited moderate employment growth in the
country (see the first row of table 5).  During the long recession of 1973-1981,
employment losses occurred.  The 1985-91 expansionary period was accompanied by
a large increase in employment.  The employment losses and gains were unevenly
distributed among regions.  Overall, regions that experienced slow growth in GDP
tended to have low or negative employment growth rates, but the opposite is not
always true.  For example, Extremadura, with high GDP growth rates, performed
relatively poorly in terms of employment growth.  Cataluña and Madrid tended to do
relatively well in terms of employment growth in expansionary periods and poorly in
recessionary periods.
Examining the unemployment rates of the regions (table 6), we find that
Andalucía, Canarias and Extremadura experienced high rates of unemployment for all
periods, while other regions showed different relative values depending on the period.
 Cataluña and Madrid, for example, suffered high rates at the 1985 trough, but
relatively low rates at the end of the most recent expansion in 1991.  We note that the
average unemployment rate for Spain was very different at the beginning (2.06
percent in 1964) compared to the end of the period (16.32 percent in 1991), with largedifferences across regions throughout the period.
In recent years these high unemployment rates were not associated with high
rates of migration out of regions experiencing high unemployment into regions with
low levels.  This change of migration patterns is described in Rodenas (1994) who
found that for the period 1962-73 there were some regions from which people
primarily out-migrated, including Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla-León and
Extremadura, while there were other regions to which people primarily in-migrated,
including Cataluña, Madrid, C. Valenciana and País Vasco.  During this period,
people generally migrated from poor agricultural regions to rich, industrialized
regions.  Between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s the migration flows diminished
significantly, but there was also a change in patterns in that most regions experienced
both inflows and outflows, resulting in very small net migration flows.  Gross
migration flows picked up again in the late 1980s, but in general the new pattern
persisted so that regions with important gross flows, such as Andalucía, Cataluña,
Castilla-León, and Madrid, had small net migration flows.  An exception to this
pattern was Castilla-La Mancha, which experienced large net outflows in 1988-90. 
The only region that consistently lost population through migration was País Vasco. 
This is consistent with the general decline of the economy of this region, which may
have been reinforced by its political situation.
Table 7 summarizes the industrial mix of the regions and its evolution over
time by displaying shares of GDP for four major industries for each region in 1964,
1981 and 1991.  Overall the industrial mix of Spain evolved over time like in manyother countries; the agricultural sector declined by 1991 to less than one third of its
value in 1964, manufacturing declined by 30 percent over the same period, and
services increased its share by nearly 50 percent.  A somewhat surprising fact is the
relatively large increase in construction in recent years, which may be related to the
large amount of public construction that occurred in the late 1980s.  Differences
across regions remain over time as can be seen by the coefficients of variation.  The
agricultural sector is relatively large in Extremadura, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha,
Murcia, La Rioja, Galicia and Castilla-León, and all except La Rioja are among the
poorest regions.  It is interesting to note that with the exception of La Rioja, these are
also the regions with the highest shares of GDP in the construction industry, probably
due to large amounts of public investment carried on during the period.  Although the
services sector has become more prevalent for all regions, there are three regions that
stand out in this respect: Baleares and Canarias, two tourism regions, and Madrid,
where the central government administration is located.  Finally, three regions remain
dominant in manufacturing (País Vasco, Cataluña and Asturias), one region that
historically was industrial has become more services oriented (Cantabria), and two
regions that historically have been agricultural have become more reliant on the
manufacturing sector (La Rioja and Navarra).
Public Capital
A primary aim of the various structural grants is to finance investment in
public capital to ensure that basic infrastructure for economic activity is available.  As
can be seen from table 8, public capital has increased significantly over the periodanalyzed; it was barely 20 percent of GDP in 1964 and by 1991 it was nearly 40
percent.  Differences across regions were quite large and remained so over time.  It is
in general true for all times that poor regions tended to have larger shares of public
capital relative to GDP compared to rich regions, with a few exceptions (Navarra and
La Rioja).  In fact La Rioja changed its position quite dramatically as a result of an
extremely high public investment project in roads in 1977 that triggered a jump in
public capital in that year and put the region at the top or second to the top from then
on.  Another change over time is that of País Vasco, with a very low ratio in 1964 that
improved in the second part of the period at the same time that its GDP per capita fell.
If we interpret the above results in terms of average productivity of public
capital, i.e., reversing the ratios of table 8 to be GDP per unit of public capital, we find
that most of the poor regions had low rates of average productivity of public capital
while the rich regions had high ones.  One could argue based on these figures that
more investment in public capital in some rich regions might have a high rate of
return.
It is not by chance that we observe these facts about the relationship between
public capital and GDP because a goal behind the public investment intervention
policy has been to help poor regions to develop and to reduce regional differences in
economic well being.  Part of this public investment policy is very directly related to
the grant policy that we described in the previous section.  The question that remains
is whether this public intervention has been effective in triggering new economic
activity that would help poor regions to catch up to rich regions.  To that question weturn in the next section.
III. Analysis of the Effect of Regional Grants on Regional Economic
Performance
To assess the impact of the grants on regional economic development, we
compare the economic performance of two groups of regions before and after the
grant policy intervention.  One group consists of regions that are consistently above
average on various economic indicators and below average in terms of receipt of grant
monies from the central government of Spain and the European Union.  We label this
group the "rich" group, and it consists of Baleares, Madrid, Cataluña, La Rioja and
Navarra.  The other group consists of regions that are consistently below average on
most of the economic indicators and above average in terms of receipt of grant
monies.  We label this group the "poor" group, which consists of Extremadura,
Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla-León, Galicia, and Andalucía.
The two time periods we examine are 1977-1981 and 1989-1992 (with slight
variations on these periods depending on data availability for certain variables).  The
earlier time period ends in the year before the imposition of the FCI grant in Spain,
while the latter period is as far into the period of both Spanish and European Union
grant intervention as the data permit.  We choose roughly comparable lengths for the
two time periods.  In results not presented here but discussed below, we vary the
definitions of the time periods to test for robustness of the results.
Our approach, then, is a differences-in-differences approach where we
examine differences between the two groups in the differences across the two timeperiods for each group.  While we clearly do not have a natural experiment because
regions are not assigned randomly to be recipients or non-recipients of the grants, the
differences-in-differences approach enables us to control, if imperfectly, for other
factors affecting the different groups, regions and time periods.  If the grants are
effective, we would expect to see a larger improvement in economic well-being
between the two periods for the poor (recipient) group relative to the rich (non-
recipient) group.
In the tables that follow we present results for six different measures of
economic well-being or economic activity.  We are interested in assessing whether the
private economy has reacted to the public intervention, in other words, whether the
regional grant policies have impacted aggregate measures of economic activity
including private investment.  We examine six measures: 1) annual growth rate of real
GDP,  2) real GDP per capita, 3) unemployment rate, 4) annual growth rate of
employment, 5) annual growth rate of real private non-residential investment, and 6)
real private non-residential investment per capita.  The private investment data have
only recently become available, and, as far as we know, our study is the first to utilize
these data to evaluate regional grant policies.  For each variable we present two pieces
of evidence.  The first piece is a simple comparison of averages (over time and across
members of a group) for the rich and poor groups for the two time periods.  The
second set of results consists of a regression with annual observations by region
estimated using OLS where the independent variables include dummy variables for
each region and each year in the sample, and a dummy "intervention" variable thattakes a value of one for poor regions in the second time period only, and zero
otherwise.  These two pieces of evidence are quite similar to one another.  The simple
comparison of averages gives information about levels and the basic intuition.  The
regression analysis allows for more precise controls for time periods and region-
specific effects.
This approach and these results say very little about whether the grants have
caused changes in the economic performance of the regions.  A major difficulty we
face is that the period we examine was a period of massive changes in the economy,
policy and politics of Spain and its regions.  It would be exceedingly difficult if not
impossible to attempt to model all of the relevant processes and causes of regional
economic growth.  What our approach does is offer a simple comparison of regional
outcomes before and after the imposition of the grants, controlling for factors
common to all regions in different years and for time-invariant factors specific to
individual regions.  In table 9 we find evidence that the average annual growth rate
of real GDP improved for the poor group and decreased for the rich group between
the two time periods, and that the difference in these trends is statistically significant
(t-statistic of 2.3 in panel A and 1.8 in panel B).  Thus, without attributing causality,
there appears to be a correlation between the imposition and receipt of the grants, and
an improvement in growth rates of real GDP.  However, the results for this variable
are not robust to changes in the definition of the time periods.  For example, when the
time periods are 1973-1981 and 1985-1994 the difference between the trends for the
two groups is not statistically significant.In table 10 we examine real GDP per capita and find evidence that appears in
conflict with the findings from table 9.  The results in table 10 indicate that while real
GDP per capita increased for both groups between the two time periods, the increase
was greater for the rich group, and the difference in trends between the two groups is
statistically significant (t-statistic of 3.5 in panel A and 6.4 in panel B).  When viewed
in percentage terms, the results in table 10 can be reconciled with the unreported
results for annual growth rate of real GDP.  Using the figures in panel A, the
difference between increases in per capita GDP for the two groups is not important;
both groups experienced increases of about 40 percent between the two time periods.
The results in table 11 indicate that the unemployment rate increased for both
groups between the two time periods, but that the increase was greater for the poor
group with the difference between the two groups being statistically significant (t-
statistic of 3.8 in panel A and 8.4 in panel B).  Thus, the imposition of the grant
programs appears to be associated with a deterioration in the employment situation of
the poor group relative to the rich group as evidenced by a larger increase in the level
of unemployment for the poor relative to the rich.  These results for unemployment
rates are robust to changes in the time periods analyzed.  In panel B it is interesting to
see that relative to the omitted region of Andalucía all regions had lower
unemployment rates on average.  Also, except for 1988, the average unemployment
rate was lower in every year relative to the omitted year of 1992.
In the results displayed in table 12 we find no evidence that the imposition of
the grant programs is associated with improvements in employment growth rates.  Theaverage annual growth rate of employment increased for both groups between the two
time periods (actually, the growth rates changed from being negative in the earlier
period to being positive in the latter period), and there is no statistical difference
between the trends for the two groups (t-statistic of 0.7).  We find that the results
displayed here are robust to changes in the time periods analyzed.
Table 13 presents the results for the growth rate of real private non-residential
investment.  For both groups the results indicate that the average annual growth rate
of private investment increased substantially, and the differences between the groups
in these trends is not statistically significant (t-statistic of 0.9).  Thus, the imposition
of the grants does not appear to be correlated with faster growth in private non-
residential investment as both groups - both the rich, non-recipient group and the
poor, recipient group - experienced statistically similar improvements in private
investment growth rates.  These results are reasonably robust to changes in the time
periods analyzed, although in some specifications the poor are worse off relative to
the rich by this measure.
The results we obtain when we examine private non-residential investment per
capita differ slightly from the ones we obtain when analyzing the growth rate of
private investment.  In table 14, we find that the rich group experienced a larger
increase in private investment per capita between the two time periods relative to the
poor group, that the difference is important in percentage terms as the rich group
average increased 60 percent between the two time periods while the poor group
average increased only 27 percent, and that the difference in trends between the twogroups is statistically significant (t-statistic of 4.2 in panel A and 7.2 in panel B).  
These results, which are robust to changes in the time periods analyzed, are the
opposite of what we would expect if the grant programs had had a positive influence
on private investment decisions.
One difficulty we encounter in trying to uncover an effect of the grants on the
economies of the poor regions is that, with the limited data available, it is difficult to
untangle the effect of being a recipient region with the effect of being a poor region. 
In an effort to control for the effect of being poor we re-estimate the equations
underlying the simple differences-in-differences results of panel A of tables 9-14 by
including a lagged value of the dependent variable.  The dependent variable in these
simple equations is the change in the average value of the variable between the two
periods (pre-grants-policy period and post-grants-policy period).  The lagged
independent variable is the change in the average value of the variable between the
pre-grants-policy period and an earlier period.  The results of this estimation, as well
as the regressions underlying panel A of tables 9-14, are reported in table 15.
4
We find that controlling for a prior period in this way, essentially controlling
for persistence over time, alters the results negligibly.  The one case where inclusion
of the lagged variable makes a difference is the growth rate of employment.  The
intervention variable becomes statistically significant when the lagged variable is
included.  The sign of the intervention variable is negative indicating that poor regions
                                                       
     
4We thank Robert Moffitt for suggesting this approach to the data.are worse off compared to rich regions after the intervention.  This result is consistent
with the unemployment rate results displayed in table 11 and column (3) of table 15.
Our results for aggregate measures of the regional economies may well mask
important differences at the industry level.  For three of our variables, annual growth
rates of real GDP, employment, and real private non-residential investment, we
estimate industry-specific equations.  For annual growth of real GDP and of real
private non-residential investment, the industry-specific results essentially confirm the
aggregate results of tables 9 and 13; there is no discernible effect of the grants policy
on investment behavior, and there is either no effect or a marginally significant
positive effect of the grants policy on GDP.  The results for the simple differences-in-
differences form of the equation for GDP and employment are presented in table 16. 
The results for annual growth of employment generally support the aggregate results
of table 12 except for the services industry, where we find that the intervention has a
positive significant effect on services employment growth.  Unfortunately, with the
available data, we cannot separate private from public employment in the services
sector, and this distinction may be of great relevance to understanding the positive
effect for the services sector.  The intervention period coincides with a time of great
expansion of the public sector including public services in Spain, which may have
been more important for the poor regions.
To summarize, except for annual growth rate of real GDP, not one of the sets
of results for the six variables supports the notion that the economies of the poor
regions have been differentially assisted by the grant programs.  And even the resultsfor annual growth rate of real GDP are not robust to changes in the time period
analyzed.  In fact, the evidence suggests that when we compare a period just before
the imposition of the grants to a period well into the receipt of monies from the grants
the position of the rich group was improved relative to the position of the poor group
on three measures - real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and real private non-
residential investment per capita.
Our findings are in line with a recent study of specific projects funded by the
EU grants (FEDEA, 1994).  In an empirical analysis of fifteen regions from 1980 to
1991, the authors estimate equations with value added as the dependent variable and
public investment funded by both the FCI and FEDER as independent variables. 
They find that the public investment variables are not significant determinants of
value added in the regions.
Both the Spanish central government grants and the European Union grants
are directed in large part towards increasing the amount of public infrastructure in the
poorer regions.  In table 17 we examine whether differences across poor and rich
regions in investment in public infrastructure reflect these redistributive policies.  In
panel A we see that the growth rate of real public investment increased dramatically
for both groups between the two periods, but by much more for the rich group,
although the difference between the two groups is not significant.  In panel B the
results indicate that real public investment per capita was marginally significantly
higher for the poor group in the latter period relative to the rich group.  In fact inpercentage terms the poor group figure increased by 200 percent, while the level for
the rich group increased by less than 40 percent.  Thus, it appears that the imposition
of the grants may be correlated with changes in levels of investment in public capital
across the two groups, where the changes have favored the poor group.  Over a longer
horizon these public capital differences may manifest themselves in relative
improvements in economic development in the poor regions.  However, studies of the
productivity of public capital appear to indicate that public capital investment is  not a
particularly effective tool for regional economic development.
5
Conclusion
Regional redistribution is an important part of the policy of the European
Union and the Spanish government.  In this study we find that these policies have not
been effective at stimulating private investment or improving the overall economies of
the poorer regions.  The lack of impact may be attributable to several factors.  First,
the policies were only implemented in recent years (1982 for the Spanish FCI and
1986 for the EU grants) and these sorts of policies directed at infrastructure
improvement and structural change of the labor market may take time to have an
impact.  Second, the amounts of the grants are not large even for the very poor
regions.  It just may be that the interventions were too weak to have had an effect. 
Third, while we present no evidence on how the funds are used, it seems clear that
certain uses are likely to be more productive than others, and it is not clear that the
                                                       
     
5See Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1996) and Holtz-Eakin (1994).monies are well targeted to the most productive investments.   The Economist has
argued that there are likely to be inefficiencies in the EU structural grant process and
in the management of the program.
6  In a FEDEA (1994) study evaluating
approximately 350 projects funded by FEDER between 1989 and 1993, the authors
find that, while there is room for improvement, the projects are generally well-
managed; the problem may not be so much mismanagement of funds, but rather lack
of targeting or general planning of the projects, which are sometimes considered in
isolation, instead of in an overall plan for regional development.  Fourth, the period
we examine has been a tumultuous one for Spain with numerous changes in the
policy, politics and economies of the regions, rendering it difficult to detect an effect
of the regional grant policies.
An alternative explanation for our findings is that regional development
policies, at least the kind described here, are doomed to fail.  The persistence of
differential economic performances across regions over time, as evidenced by
Blanchard and Katz (1992), for example, whether regional policies exist or not, is
prima-facie evidence that factors, which are not well understood and non-obvious, are
at work.  Without a better understanding of how regions develop and how the fates of
regions are determined, we cannot expect government intervention to be effective.
Appendix: Data Sources
                                                       
     
6See "Fund of disappointment" page 46 of the January 27, 1996 issue of  The
Economist.The data used in this paper come from several sources that we detail below.
"Renta Nacional de España y su distribución provincial: serie homogénea 1955-91",
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV).  This is the source for regional GDP, both total and by
industries, and for disposable income.  The data are biannual.
"Contabilidad Regional de España", Instituto Nacional de Estadística.  This is the
source for annual GDP data from 1980-91.
"Capital humano 1964-1992", Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas
(IVIE) and Fundación Bancaixa.  Employment, labor force and population data up to
1992 were obtained from this source.
"Estimación del crecimiento del PIB por Comunidades Autónomas. Año 1994",
Papeles de Economía Española, No. 64, 1995, anexo 11 Junio 1995.  Source for
GDP, disposable income and population for 1994.  This series follows the same
methodology as the BBV.  BBV has the advantage that the data series begins at a
much earlier date, but unfortunately the series is updated with a long delay.  For this
reason we use a different source for 1994 data.
"El stock capital en España y sus Comunidades Autónomas",  Fundación BBV. 
Provides data for private and public capital and investment for the period 1964-1991.
Annuario Estadístico del Instituto Nacional de Estadística  (INE) is the source for
migration data for the period 1978 to 1993.
"Fondos Comunitarios en España: regionalización y análisis de su incidencia", by
M.D. Correa, A. Fanlo, J. Manzanedo and S. Santillán, Documento de Trabajo D-
95002, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.  This is the source for the European
funds for 1986-1993 by region.
For the Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial (the Spanish FCI) we have used four
sources of data:
- "Dessarrollo del proceso autonómico en el perído 1986-89",  Ministerio de
Economía y Hacienda
- "Informe sobre financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas en 1993",
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
- "Finançament de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 1980-91",  Institut d'Estadítica
de Catalunya
- "Informe económico financiero de las Administraciones Territoriales en
1992", Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas , Colección Memorias y
Estadísticas, Madrid, 1993.References
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FEDER   FCI  FSE           FEOGA Or FEOGA Ga funds funds
ANDALUCIA 17,966 47,187 7,567 2,487 43,410 28,020  
75,207
ARAGON   9,642 19,599 4,829 7,596 52,041 22,067   41,666
ASTURIAS 22,440 23,039 6,402 4,301   5,413 33,143   56,182
BALEARES   1,559 13,936 3,490 1,708   5,212   6,757   20,693
CANARIAS 19,787 45,102 6,809 3,305   5,222 29,901   75,004
CANTABRIA   9,151 17,753 4,852 4,881 12,068 18,884   36,637
CASTILLA-LEON 20,536 38,204 6,795 6,625 44,744 33,956   72,160
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 28,812 49,227 5,754 6,826 80,120 41,392   90,619
CATALUÑA   3,916 15,857 4,845 1,057 10,414   9,818   25,675
C. VALENCIANA   7,841 18,365 4,511 1,958   7,595 14,310   32,675
EXTREMADURA 28,420 77,912 8,811 6,354 79,333 43,586 121,498
GALICIA 14,044 46,403 5,637 6,073   6,934 25,755   72,158
MADRID   1,562 12,088 4,276 0,282   1,756   6,120   18,208
MURCIA 13,639 25,349 6,351 2,990 26,750 22,981   48,330
NAVARRA   4,320 11,764 5,633 5,430 35,587 15,383   27,148
PAIS VASCO   7,968 19,798 6,411 2,689   6,649 17,068  
36,866
LA RIOJA   3,453 13,695 4,230 4,011 34,907 11,694   25,389
SPAIN 11,975 29,970 5,795 3,101 23,609 20,871  
50,841
Coefficient of Variation
*     0.71     0.63   0.24    0.55     0.96
These figures are the sum from 1986 to 1993 of the annual per capita values, except for FCI where the sample is from 1982 to 1993,
EU structural funds include FEDER, FSE and FEOGA Orientacion; Structural funds are the EU structural funds plus FCI.Unit: pesetas of 1980 per person.
* for the 17 AC’sTable 2
FUNDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF G.D.P.
Total EU
structural
FEDER   FCI  FSE          FEOGA Or FEOGA Ga funds
ANDALUCIA 0.59% 1.26% 0.25% 0.06%     1.37% 0.89%
ARAGON 0.24% 0.41% 0.10% 0.09%     0.95% 0.43%
ASTURIAS 0.72% 0.52% 0.15% 0.10%     0.15% 0.97%
BALEARES 0.02% 0.25% 0.06% 0.02%     0.10% 0.10%
CANARIAS 0.35% 0.95% 0.17% 0.05%     0.00% 0.57%
CANTABRIA 0.26% 0.39% 0.10% 0.09%     0.33% 0.45%
CASTILLA-LEON 0.56% 0.90% 0.20% 0.13%     1.12% 0.89%
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 0.89% 1.22% 0.18% 0.17%     1.86% 1.24%
CATALUÑA 0.06% 0.31% 0.09% 0.01%     0.21% 0.17%
C. VALENCIANA 0.14% 0.39% 0.10% 0.04%     0.17% 0.28%
EXTREMADURA 0.83% 2.55% 0.33% 0.19%     2.74% 1.35%
GALICIA 0.27% 1.16% 0.17% 0.13%     0.23% 0.57%
MADRID 0.03% 0.23% 0.09% 0.00%     0.03% 0.12%
MURCIA 0.37% 0.54% 0.17% 0.07%     0.62% 0.61%
NAVARRA 0.04% 0.22% 0.12% 0.07%     0.63% 0.23%
PAIS VASCO 0.08% 0.36% 0.11% 0.05%     0.14% 0.24%
LA RIOJA 0.05% 0.23% 0.07% 0.05%     0.69% 0.16%
SPAIN 0.27% 0.63% 0.14% 0.06%     0.53% 0.46%
Coefficient of Variation
*    0.91     0.86     0.48     0.67       1.12
These figures are the share of the sum of the annual data for each fund over the sum of the annual G.D.P. for the same
sample as the fund.
EU structural funds include FEDER, FSE and FEOGA Orientacion.
Unit: percentage of funds over G.D.P., both measured in pesetas of 1980.
Sample: From 1986 to 1991 except for FCI which is from 1982 to 1991.
* for the 17 AC’sTable 3
REAL G.D.P. PER CAPITA
  1964   1973   1981   1985   1991   1994
SPAIN      100      100      100      100      100
     100
ANDALUCIA   65.55   72.68   73.35   71.37   71.77
  71.68
ARAGON 104.65 102.52 103.98 109.96 108.76 108.31
ASTURIAS 104.93 106.95   99.39   95.43   87.60   87.43
BALEARES 130.36 149.20 130.79 149.96 142.22 157.75
CANARIAS   75.70   91.01   96.26   95.07   96.26 103.95
CANTABRIA 127.73 106.20   98.74   97.79   91.12   88.03
CASTILLA-LEON   87.64   82.96   84.46   89.17   87.47   90.15
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA   66.97   77.83   75.78   76.97   82.95   82.31
CATALUÑA 149.86 130.20 125.81 123.35 125.84 122.93
C. VALENCIANA 101.67 103.90 103.60 104.19 102.00 101.12
EXTREMADURA   52.83   59.25   61.58   65.92   68.17   68.76
GALICIA   67.38   70.05   79.65   80.51   81.49   83.35
MADRID 147.64 126.73 132.20 130.67 129.57 127.93
MURCIA   72.44   83.84   85.07   83.89   82.58   81.33
NAVARRA 123.22 110.97 107.96 109.26 115.80 117.01
PAIS VASCO 162.43 135.33 110.38 110.74 110.01
109.42
LA RIOJA 117.12 103.44 107.14 108.93 107.49 109.32
SPAIN 224,502 352,759 396,207 423,766 536,695        
542,362
Table 4
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF REAL G.D.P. PER CAPITA
1964-1973 1973-1981 1981-1985 1985-1991 1991-1994
SPAIN     5.15%     1.46%     1.70%     4.02%     0.35%
ANDALUCIA     6.36%     1.58%     1.00%     4.11%     0.31%
ARAGON     4.91%     1.64%     3.12%     3.83%     0.21%
ASTURIAS     5.37%     0.54%     0.67%     2.54%     0.29%
BALEARES     6.74%   -0.19%     5.23%     3.10%     3.88%
CANARIAS     7.32%     2.18%     1.38%     4.23%     2.96%
CANTABRIA     3.01%     0.54%     1.45%     2.80%   -0.80%
CASTILLA-LEON     4.51%     1.69%     3.09%     3.68%     1.36%
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA     6.92%     1.12%     2.09%     5.32%     0.09%
CATALUÑA     3.52%     1.03%     1.20%     4.36%   -0.43%
C. VALENCIANA     5.40%     1.42%     1.84%     3.65%     0.06%
EXTREMADURA     6.50%     1.95%     3.45%     4.60%     0.64%
GALICIA     5.60%     3.10%     1.97%     4.22%     1.11%
MADRID     3.38%     2.00%     1.40%     3.87%   -0.07%
MURCIA     6.87%     1.65%     1.34%     3.74%   -0.16%
NAVARRA     3.93%     1.11%     2.00%     5.03%     0.70%PAIS VASCO     3.04%   -1.09%     1.78%     3.90%     0.17%
LA RIOJA     3.71%     1.91%     2.12%     3.79%     0.92%Table 5
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT
1964-1973 1973-1981 1981-1985 1985-1991
SPAIN     0.98%   -1.72%   -1.28%     2.83%
ANDALUCIA     0.16%   -2.91%   -1.00%     3.75%
ARAGON   -0.31%   -1.39%   -1.71%     2.47%
ASTURIAS     0.22%   -1.55%   -2.00%     0.32%
BALEARES     1.30%   -0.37%     0.13%     3.18%
CANARIAS     2.00%   -0.39%   -0.54%     2.98%
CANTABRIA     0.14%   -1.05%   -1.78%     0.25%
CASTILLA-LEON   -1.27%   -1.27%   -2.20%     1.97%
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA   -1.10%   -2.97%     0.15%     2.14%
CATALUÑA     2.22%   -1.48%   -2.25%     4.32%
C. VALENCIANA     1.39%   -0.93%   -1.09%     3.12%
EXTREMADURA   -1.03%   -3.34%   -2.29%     2.61%
GALICIA     1.00%   -2.22%   -0.37%   -0.53%
MADRID     3.32%   -1.45%   -0.68%     3.70%
MURCIA     1.44%   -0.99%   -0.40%     3.03%
NAVARRA     0.46%   -0.99%   -0.83%     2.75%
PAIS VASCO     1.80%   -1.55%   -2.16%     2.55%
LA RIOJA     0.45%   -0.75%   -2.96%     3.08%
Table 6
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
1964 1973 1981 1985 1991
SPAIN 2.06% 2.47% 14.36% 21.64%
16.32%
ANDALUCIA 5.12% 5.60% 21.05% 29.63%
25.81%
ARAGON 0.48% 1.48% 11.77% 17.61%   9.90%
ASTURIAS 0.24% 1.01% 11.68% 18.42% 15.86%
BALEARES 2.40% 1.29%   9.78% 13.89%   9.94%
CANARIAS 2.68% 1.65% 16.56% 25.68% 24.48%
CANTABRIA 0.49% 1.42% 10.15% 15.54% 16.00%
CASTILLA-LEON 1.18% 1.82% 10.30% 18.05% 14.92%
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 1.34% 2.86% 14.04% 16.56% 12.97%
CATALUÑA 1.33% 1.22% 15.32% 22.69% 12.28%
C. VALENCIANA 0.96% 1.30% 13.37% 20.76% 15.70%
EXTREMADURA 4.98% 4.99% 17.92% 27.29% 23.84%
GALICIA 1.90% 3.05%   5.88% 12.81% 12.21%
MADRID 0.95% 1.66% 15.25% 22.10% 12.16%
MURCIA 4.47% 3.86% 12.73% 20.16% 18.13%
NAVARRA 1.12% 1.57% 12.98% 18.89% 10.60%PAIS VASCO 0.40% 1.48% 16.16% 23.61%
18.52%
LA RIOJA 1.03% 0.66%   7.52% 17.36%   9.62%Table 7
SHARE OF G.D.P. BY INDUSTRY
  AGRICULTURE             SERVICES             CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
1964 1981 1991 1964 1981 1991 1964 1981 1991 1964 1981 1991
ANDALUCIA 23.77% 12.48% 10.46% 43.47% 59.70% 62.37% 6.96% 8.14% 11.28% 25.80% 19.68% 15.89%
ARAGON 23.56% 6.64% 6.42% 38.93% 56.22% 56.35% 6.76% 7.61% 8.36% 30.75% 29.53% 28.87%
ASTURIAS 14.62% 5.26% 3.60% 32.13% 49.00% 54.56% 6.72% 5.25% 9.37% 46.53% 40.49% 32.47%
BALEARES 14.14% 3.20% 1.94% 57.37% 76.51% 79.74% 7.69% 8.05% 8.25% 20.80% 12.25% 10.07%
CANARIAS 26.50% 7.00% 3.99% 46.40% 72.49% 76.84% 6.65% 9.95% 9.22% 20.45% 10.56% 9.95%
CANTABRIA 16.78% 7.95% 5.71% 34.35% 53.75% 60.78% 5.01% 5.91% 8.04% 43.86% 32.39% 25.47%
CASTILLA-LEON 30.94% 9.60% 8.68% 36.13% 54.38% 55.39% 5.61% 7.84% 9.56% 27.32% 28.19% 26.37%
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 38.58% 16.35% 11.14% 32.98% 49.69% 51.18% 4.39% 10.90% 12.62% 24.06% 23.06% 25.05%
CATALUÑA 7.92% 2.69% 1.92% 43.12% 56.92% 59.79% 6.83% 5.02% 8.04% 42.13% 35.37% 30.25%
C. VALENCIANA 21.43% 6.17% 4.31% 40.31% 58.02% 60.17% 6.24% 6.43% 8.29% 32.02% 29.38% 27.23%
EXTREMADURA 37.51% 17.06% 12.41% 37.96% 57.73% 57.16% 7.18% 10.21% 13.02% 17.35% 14.99% 17.41%
GALICIA 33.73% 12.83% 9.14% 35.60% 55.49% 57.62% 6.15% 8.96% 11.37% 24.52% 22.72% 21.87%
MADRID 2.16% 0.45% 0.47% 62.60% 73.31% 74.24% 7.71% 5.16% 7.09% 27.53% 21.08% 18.20%
MURCIA 22.34% 9.81% 9.77% 39.71% 54.70% 58.31% 5.25% 8.54% 10.22% 32.71% 26.94% 21.70%
NAVARRA 28.35% 8.62% 5.48% 36.27% 47.24% 50.36% 5.19% 6.10% 7.98% 30.20% 38.04% 36.17%
PAIS VASCO 7.85% 3.52% 2.73% 36.42% 48.86% 54.40% 5.64% 3.51% 6.73% 50.10% 44.11% 36.13%
LA RIOJA 40.22% 13.55% 9.51% 29.55% 50.01% 52.66% 4.40% 6.89% 7.60% 25.84% 29.54% 30.24%
SPAIN 17.87% 6.43% 5.00% 42.90% 59.57% 62.44% 6.49% 6.62% 8.93% 32.74% 27.38% 23.90%
C. OF VARIATION 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.33Table 8
PUBLIC CAPITAL AS A SHARE OF G.D.P.
1964 1973 1981 1985 1991
SPAIN 20.47% 24.28% 31.09% 34.75%
37.50%
ANDALUCIA 25.35% 30.17% 37.86% 43.26%
50.92%
ARAGON 34.88% 38.19% 54.24% 53.54% 51.56%
ASTURIAS 22.89% 26.61% 33.84% 41.09% 47.74%
BALEARES 18.97% 17.02% 21.59% 21.40% 23.72%
CANARIAS 25.82% 31.33% 40.00% 43.82% 44.83%
CANTABRIA 17.82% 21.68% 29.50% 35.10% 47.79%
CASTILLA-LEON 32.95% 39.04% 48.98% 53.00% 55.98%
CASTILLA-LA MANCHA 35.61% 38.46% 49.94% 56.07% 58.78%
CATALUÑA 12.09% 18.00% 21.00% 24.11% 24.60%
C. VALENCIANA 16.19% 20.77% 28.11% 31.70% 33.22%
EXTREMADURA 43.68% 45.22% 53.80% 57.97% 69.33%
GALICIA 28.36% 26.97% 33.98% 39.71% 45.81%
MADRID   9.91% 14.48% 15.77% 16.22% 17.05%
MURCIA 21.24% 17.76% 28.53% 35.07% 42.21%
NAVARRA 29.88% 28.19% 53.26% 52.36% 52.37%
PAIS VASCO 13.97% 21.69% 34.71% 42.04%
45.47%
LA RIOJA 21.05% 24.48% 76.33% 73.09% 61.71%Table 9
GROWTH RATE OF REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Panel A
(Percentages)
1977-81 1989-94 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group 1.33 1.47
Between Periods




Constant  0.0014    0.14
Baleares  0.0311    2.99
Madrid  0.0046    0.44
Cataluña -0.0035    0.34
La Rioja  0.0054    0.52
Navarra -0.0037    0.36
Extremadura  0.0037    0.39
Castilla-La Mancha -0.0097    1.02
Castilla-Leon -0.0156    1.64
Galicia -0.0038    0.40
1977-79  0.0313    4.26
1979-81  0.0030    0.41
1989-91  0.0091    1.52
Poor in second period  0.0154    1.82
R
2 = 0.67
Omitted variables are Andalucia and 1991-94.
Dependent variable is annual growth rate of real GDP.Table 10
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA
Panel A
(1980 Pesetas)
1977-81 1989-94 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group 299,663 417,217
Between Periods




Constant  0.4920 31.37
Baleares  0.2608 16.63
Madrid  0.2232 14.24
Cataluña  0.2041 13.02
La Rioja  0.1274   8.12
Navarra  0.1508   9.62
Extremadura -0.0348   2.43
Castilla-La Mancha  0.0375   2.62
Castilla-Leon  0.0760   5.31




1989 -0.0325   2.93
1991 -0.0157   1.42
Poor in second period -0.0821   6.41
R
2 = 0.98
Omitted variables are Andalucia and 1994




1977-81 1989-92 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group 9.87 19.19
Between Periods





Constant  0.2206 28.46
Baleares -0.1054 14.68
Madrid -0.0679   9.46
Cataluña -0.0716   9.98
La Rioja -0.1136 15.82
Navarra -0.0863 12.02
Extremadura -0.0193   2.95





1979 -0.0549   7.64
1980 -0.0327   4.55
1981 -0.0111   1.55
1988  0.0094   1.44
1989 -0.0084   1.28
1990 -0.0196   2.99
1991 -0.0215   3.28
Poor in second period  0.0493   8.41
R
2 = 0.96
Omitted variables are Andalucia and 1992.
Dependent variable is annual unemploument rate.Table 12
GROWTH RATE OF EMPLOYMENT
Panel A
(Percentage)
1977-81 1988-92 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group -2.91 0.43
Between Periods





Constant -0.0180   1.53
Baleares -0.0098   0.87
Madrid -0.0019   0.17
Cataluña -0.0002   0.02
La Rioja -0.0150   1.33
Navarra -0.0008   0.07
Extremadura -0.0063   0.61
Castilla-La Mancha -0.0088   0.85
Castilla-Leon -0.0013   0.13
Galicia -0.0191   1.85
1977-78 -0.0005   0.05
1978-79 -0.0041   0.39
1979-80 -0.0051   0.50
1980-81 -0.0059   0.57
1988-89  0.0634   6.86
1989-90  0.0466   5.04
1990-91  0.0359   3.88
Poor in second period -0.0069   0.74
R
2 = 0.67
Omitted variables are Andalucia and 1991-92.
Dependent variable is annual growth rate of employment.Table 13
GROWTH RATE OF REAL PRIVATE NON-RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT
Panel A
(Percentage)
1977-81 1988-91 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group 3.98 4.81
Between Periods





Constant  0.0235   0.47
Baleares  0.0159   0.33
Madrid -0.0114   0.24
Cataluña -0.0180   0.37
La Rioja -0.0854   1.77
Navarra -0.0307   0.64
Extremadura  0.0944   2.10
Castilla-La Mancha -0.0429   0.95
Castilla-Leon -0.0019   0.04
Galicia -0.0044   0.10
1977-78  0.0625   1.46
1978-79  0.0148   0.35
1979-80  0.0551   1.29
1980-81 -0.0881   2.06
1988-89  0.1413   3.75
1989-90  0.0214   0.57
Poor in second period -0.0366   0.90
R
2 = 0.51
Omitted variables are Andalucia and 1990-91.
Dependent variable is annual growth rate of real private non-residential investment.Table 14
REAL PRIVATE NON-RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT PER CAPITA
Panel A
(1980 Pesetas)
1977-81 1988-91 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group 111,413 141,297
Between Periods





Constant  0.1626 20.15
Baleares  0.0595   7.88
Madrid  0.0207   2.74
Cataluña  0.0476   6.30
La Rioja  0.0418   5.53
Navarra  0.0582   7.70
Extremadura  0.0348   4.96
Castilla-La Mancha  0.0490   6.98
Castilla-Leon  0.0471   6.71




1980 -0.0701   9.52
1981 -0.0839 11.39
1988 -0.0217   3.26
1989 -0.0018   0.27
1990  0.0008   0.11
Poor in second period -0.0453   7.18
R
2 = 0.89
Omitted variables are Andalucia and 1991.
Dependent variable is annual real private non-residential investment per capita.Table 15




















































































2 0.41 0.65 0.64 0.38 0.34 0.93
Notes: Each regression has ten observations corresponding to the ten regions.
The dependent variable is the difference between the average value for the variable in the post intervention period (typically 1988 to 1992) and the
average value for the variable in the pre-intervention period (1977 to 1981).
The lagged dependent variable is defined analogously to the dependent variable with the periods 1977 to 1981 and 1973 to 1977.
Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
The variable “poor” takes a value of one for the five poor regions and zero for the five rich regions. See the text for a list of the regions.Table 16
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES REGRESSIONS
Growth Rate of Value Added (GDP)
       (1)           (2)      (3)          (4)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction
Constant     0.063       -0.042   0.014       0.086
    (1.21)        (2.40)   (1.70)       (2.19)
Poor    -0.030         0.029   0.019      -0.065
    (0.41)        (1.14)   (1.62)       (1.17)
R
2      0.02          0.14    0.25        0.15
Growth Rate of Employment
       (1)           (2)      (3)          (4)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Construction
Constant    -0.014       -0.034   0.019       0.129
    (0.25)        (1.93)   (3.06)       (5.32)
Poor    -0.032        -0.001   0.025      -0.073
    (0.41)        (0.05)   (2.94)       (2.14)
R
2      0.02          0.00    0.52        0.36
Notes: Each regression has ten observations corresponding to the ten regions.
The dependent variable is the difference between the average value for the variable in the
post intervention period (1989 to 1991) and the average value for the variable in the pre-
intervention period (1977 to 1981).
Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. The variable “poor” takes a value of one for
the five poor regions and zero for the five rich regions. See the text for a list of the regions.Table 17
MEASURES OF GOVERNMENT POLICY INTERVENTION
Panel A
Growth Rate of Real Public Investment (percentages)
1977-81 1988-91 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group -4.48 17.81
Between Periods
Rich Group -19.48 13.07 -10.28
(1.29)
Panel B
Real Public Investment per Capita (1980 pesetas)
1977-81 1988-91 Difference Between
Groups in Differences
Poor Group 20,027 61,097
Between Periods
Rich Group 37,848 51,416 27,502
(1.69)
T-statistics in parentheses.